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It is surprising that the European Union has failed to create a Unitary 
Patent which would fully liberalise the flow of ideas as the single market 
facilitated the flow of capital and people. This is apparent when one con-
siders that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly 
mandates the Council and the Parliament of the EU to “establish meas-
ures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide 
uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union 
and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordina-
tion and supervision arrangements”.1It is true that a European Patent 
has existed since 1973, but nomenclature should not be mistaken for real-
ity. The European Patent Convention (EPC) in fact serves only to make 
the fragmentary nature of intellectual property law tolerable for those 
intent on seeking patent protection across the European Union. It does 
so outside of European Union mechanisms, which is made plain by the 
fact that several non-member states are signatories. More importantly, 
the EPC does not create anything which resembles a single patent title.
In light of this, recent attempts by the Commission and the Council of 
the EU to create a unitary patent are welcome. Recent patent disputes, 
both in Europe and across the Atlantic, have been hailed as a sign of inad-
equacies in the current system of patent application and protection. 
1.   TFEU Article 118(1).
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The size of settlements and legal fees 
has led commentators, lawmakers and 
members of the judiciary to question 
whether the current approach is desirable 
from the point of the consumer or even 
sustainable. In particular, certain groups 
of patents are maligned, whether they are 
software or business method patents, or 
those owned by so-called patent trolls.
The originators of the proposed European 
unitary patent, however, have shown little 
appetite for substantively altering existing 
patent rules with respect either to grounds 
for validity, infringement or compulsory 
licensing. Indeed, the only clauses which 
have substantive legal content have been 
deleted at the request of the British govern-
ment. Instead, the changes implemented by 
the most recent version of the proposal for 
a unitary patent are administrative rather 
than legal. That is by no means to say that 
the changes proposed would have no impact 
onthe way in which patents are created 
and litigated. On the contrary, the admin-
istrative system proposed by the European 
Council would bring about substantial 
changes in the European patent system. 
It is my opinion that these changes will 
bring about a distinct improvement in the 
way in which patents are issued and litigated. 
Simplification and harmonisation across 
the Union should result in lower costs for 
applicants and disputing parties, meaning 
that less wealth will be diverted from the 
productive activities undertaken by patent 
proprietors. This is neither to say that the 
patent package as it stands is flawless, nor 
that it represents the ne plus ultra in the field 
of patent protection and issuance reform. As 
I will demonstrate, the package has its fail-
ings. Many of these are minor and removable 
flies in the ointment of the reform propos-
alsbut, if anything, this makes their presence 
more frustrating. So too is there scope for 
more sweeping reforms of patent law that 
might build on the institutions and practises 
developed in accordance with this package.
The Current State of the Package
In April 2011, the European Commission 
made a proposal to create a European Pat-
ent with unitary effect using the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ framework, the use of which is 
testament to the eagerness of the Commission 
to reform the present system. Despite initial 
disagreements over the location of the central 
division of the court system intended to deal 
with the new unitary patent, a compromise 
solution dividing the court into three has 
since met with approval. Thus, the Council 
and European Parliament were, by the end of 
June 2012 able to take position on the proposal 
and begin the process of having the necessary 
international agreements signed. In a recent 
press statement, the Commission indicated 
that it expected the first unitary patents to be 
granted in April 2014, promising “a one-stop 
shop for obtaining a patent having immedi-
ate effect in most parts of the EU’s territory, 
combined with a single specialised patent 
court ensuring the highest review standards”.2
Hopes of the Commission’s proposal 
being swiftly enacted were, however, 
dashed when MEPs reacted badly to the 
last-minute removal of articles 6 to 8 from 
the Regulation. The website of the European 
Parliament reported MEPs describing the 
actions of the Commission as a “strik-
ing break” and intimating that if the three 
clauses in question were deleted, the mat-
ter would be referred to the European 
Court of Justice as a ‘crash test’ case.3
The issue was discussed again 10 July by 
Legal Affairs Committee MEPs, but discus-
2.   http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/12/509
3.   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/content/20120703IPR48182/html/EU-patent-Par-
liament-postpones-vote-due-to-Council’s-last-minute-
change
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sions relating to the deletion of the articles 
remain contentious. Bernhard Rapkay (S&D, 
DE), who is responsible for the draft leg-
islation, told the Legal Affairs Committee 
that the change made by the Commission 
“infringes EU law … [i]f you take that con-
tent out, there is nothing left to regulate”, 
concluding that the new form of the pat-
ent package “would not be effective at all”. 
Only one MEP, Sajjad Karim (ECR, UK) 
indicated support for the removal of the 
three articles, saying that they would have 
made the system “too slow”.4 The Committee 
decided in the same session that the patent 
package should be discussed again after the 
summer recess, possibly in September.
It looks, then, like further substantial 
delays might blight the implementation of 
the ‘patent package’. While it is likely that 
further compromise will be made on the 
proposed reforms, the negotiations which 
are set to begin in September may well 
be prolonged, and their likely outcome 
is unclear. Instead of guessing as to the 
likely shape of the patent package which is 
eventually agreed upon, I will evaluate the 
proposals madeby the Commission before 
making the case for an alternative refor-
mation of the European patent system.
Provisions of the ‘Patent Package’
Before the likely impact of the ‘patent 
package’ is assessed, it is necessary briefly to 
outline its key and most operative provisions 
as presented in the Regulation implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection (Brussels, 13.4.2011 
COM(2011) 215 final) and the Draft agreement 
on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute 
4.   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bIM-PRESS%2b2
0120709IPR48484%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2f
EN&language=EN
(Brussels, 11 November 2011, 16741/11).
The Regulation essentially provides an 
alternative to the system of patents under the 
European Patent Convention. In the existing 
EPC framework, applications for patents are 
made to the European Patent Office specifying 
in which of the signatory states the applicant 
wishes to obtain patent protection. If the 
application is deemed acceptable, the EPO 
then issues a bundle of national patents which 
are severally but not jointly defensible. That is, 
if a patent proprietor believed that his patent 
was being infringed, he would be obliged to 
bring actions in each of the states in which 
the EPO granted him patent protection.
In contrast to this, the Regulation proposes 
a system which adopts the machinery of the 
EPO and the EPC to a certain extent, but 
crucially enables applications for a European 
Patent with unitary effect. This ‘unitary effect’ 
not only reduces the linguistic issues associ-
ated with the EPC patent model and replaces 
many patents with one, but also means that 
the patent “may only be limited, licensed, 
transferred, revoked or lapse in respect of all 
the participating Member States” (Art. 3(2)). 
In addition to the Regulation, the particu-
lars of which are outlined above, the ‘patent 
package’ as it currently stands proposes 
the creation of a new system of courts to be 
called the Unified Patent Court, accompa-
nied by three committees for administration, 
budgeting and advising the Court. 
The proposed Unified Patent Court is 
to be established as a court common to the 
contracting member states thus subject to the 
same obligations under Union Law as any 
national court of the contracting member 
states5. Moreover, the Court is to be a tiered 
system comprised of a Court of First Instance 
and a Court of Appeal.6 The Court of First 
Instance is to be comprised of a central divi-
5.   Art. 1, UPC Draft Agreement
6.   Art. 4(1) 
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sion, as well as local and regional Divisions.7 
Local divisions (to a maximum of three) 
will be created by request in each contract-
ing member state, and contracting member 
states may group together to create a regional 
division if they so wish.8 The locationcen-
tral division was the focus of a great deal of 
controversy, and negotiations have recently 
resulted in its division between London, Paris 
and Munich. Cases decided by the Court of 
First Instance can be appealed on points of 
law and fact, provided that certain procedural 
criteria are met.9 In addition to the institu-
tions outlined above, the Draft Agreement also 
effects the creation of several ancillary bodies. 
These include a Mediation and Arbitration 
Centre10 and a training programme for both 
legally and technically qualified judges.11
Analysis of the ‘Patent Package’
With the rough structure of the pro-
posal to create a European patent with 
unitary effect and a Unified Patent Court 
in mind, it is now possible to begin 
with an evaluation of the package.
Perhaps the most prudent place to start 
such an evaluation is with articles 6-8 of the 
Regulation, since it is their deletion that cur-
rently threatens to derail the entire project. 
These articles constitute the only engagement 
on the part of the proposed Regulation with 
substantive patent law. In many respects, 
this is a striking and confusing fact in and 
of itself because Articles 6-8 deal only with 
(6) the right of proprietors to prevent direct 
use of their invention, (7) the indirect use 
of the invention and (8) relate the limitation 
of the effects of the European patent with 
7.   Art. 5(1) 
8.   Art. 5(2),(5) 
9.   Arts. 45-48, 
10.   Art. 17
11.   Art. 14(1)
unitary effect. That is, the patent law which 
is contained in the Regulation makes no men-
tion of the criteria by which a patent should 
be judged valid or invalid, nor does it limit 
the rights of the patent holder by legislating 
for the existence of compulsory licenses.
While the first of these two omissions may 
be forgiven on the grounds that the Regula-
tion devolves the question of patent validity 
to the EPC, the second ought to be cause for 
some concern. Professor Matthias Lamping 
of the Max Plank Institute, in an article con-
demning the Regulation as potentially illegal, 
writes that “[it] merely unifies the creation 
of protection and the acts of infringement, 
while there is a huge deficit with regard to the 
functional balance of the system. This gives 
the impression that the patent is an exclu-
sive right without limiting contours.”12If this 
reading of the situation is correct, the omis-
sion is a serious problem for any proposed 
patent system and the Commission’s deci-
sion only to include Articles defining patent 
infringement is puzzling in the extreme.
A more plausible explanation of the 
inclusion of an incomplete description 
of patent rights in the Regulation is that 
it was considered necessary to include 
some substantive legal articles in order 
to satisfy the conditions of Art. 118 of 
TFEU. This Article reads as follows:
In the context of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property 
rights to provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights throughout the 
12.   Lamping, Matthias, Enhanced Cooperation - A 
Proper Approach to Market Integration in the Field of 
Unitary Patent Protection? (October 20, 2011). Interna-
tional Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, No. 8, 2011
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Union and for the setting up of centralised 
Union-wide authorisation, coordination 
and supervision arrangements.
It is important to note that this Article 
does not mean that a unitary patent can only 
be created by an EU-wide right governed by 
EU law.13 According to Professor Sir Robin 
Jacob, fears that the deletion of clauses 6-8 will 
make the Regulation illegal are misguided: 
All that is necessary for the proposed Regulation 
is that the basis of a unitary EU right is 
created.   Art. 118 does not require that all the 
grounds for the existence of the right (validity) 
and its legal extent must be governed by EU 
law… Putting it another way, creation of the 
unitary patent requires no more than that a 
patent having a unitary nature complies with 
Art. 118.  All questions of validity, scope of 
protection and definition of infringement are 
not necessarily part of EU law. They perhaps 
could be – though there could be conflict with 
the independent international Treaty which 
is the EPC, but that is another matter.14
If it is accepted that Articles 6-8 are not 
necessary in order for the Regulation to be 
considered lawful, then the debate over their 
inclusion devolves to a question of whether 
or not they are desirable. The chief charge 
levelled against the articles is that by mak-
ing Arts. 6-8 part of EU law, the question as 
to whether a product or process constituted 
an infringement under Arts. 6 and 7, or was 
exempted by Art. 8 could be referred to the 
CJEU. This would have two significantly 
detrimental effects on the litigation of patent 
disputes. The first is that substantial delays 
and costs could be occasioned by the potential 
division of relevant cases in to two parts, one 
13.   P.2, Prof. Sir Robin Jacob, http://www.eplawpat-
entblog.com/2011/November/Robin%2020Jacob%20
20Opinion%2020re%2020Arts.pdf
14.   Ibid.
question dealt with by the local or regional 
division of the UPC and the other by the 
CJEU. The second is that referrals to the CJEU 
would undermine the entire point of hav-
ing a highly specialised patent court system 
in the form of the UPC. The combination, 
in the words of Sir Robin Jacob, “would be 
disastrous”.15 While it may be the case that a 
combination of the application of the acteclair 
doctrine and prudent rulings by the CJEU 
could reduce the damage caused by these 
Articles, if they are unnecessary in the first 
place, then there is no conceivable reason for 
the deficiencies they create to be tolerated.
Another problem with the patent pack-
age is created by the very unitary nature 
of the proposed patent which is supposed 
to be its distinctive advantage. Since rul-
ings made by the Court of First Instance, 
regardless of the location of the particular 
division, relating to a patent’s validity and 
the nature or fact of its infringement will 
affect a unitary patent across all CMSs forum 
shopping could legitimately be expected. 
It may be true that Art. 15a of the Agree-
ment places some restrictions on where 
actions may be brought, but these are such 
that a considerable amount of choice is left to 
the parties as to the eventual location of the 
trial. 15a(1)b, for instance, reads as follows:
The local division hosted by the Contracting 
Member State where the defendant or, in 
the case of multiple defendants, one of the 
defendants has his residence, or principal 
place of business, or in the absence of 
residence or principal place of business, place 
of business, or the regional division in which 
this Contracting Member State participates.
Plainly, in a situation where there 
are enough transnational patent dis-
putes to warrant the creation of a patent 
with unitary effect, many defendants 
15. Ibid.
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may well be able to choose between a 
number of local or regional divisions.
In a meeting of the House of Commons 
European Scrutiny Committee, potential 
benefits associated with forum shopping were 
identified. Baroness Wilcox, agreeing with two 
witnesses commented that “genuine competi-
tion on a fair basis can lead to efficiency and 
improvements”. Favourable parallels with 
the competition between the UK High Court 
and the Patents County Court were also 
made.16Unfortunately, this assessment of the 
opportunities for forum shopping created 
by the proposed patent package seems to be 
based on a faulty premise. Rather than choos-
ing what they see as the best or most qualified 
division, it is surely the case that defendants 
will choose the division which they feel is 
the most likely deliver a favourable result. 
Moreover, it is highly likely that the 
problems associated with forum shopping 
will have a disproportionately negative 
impact on small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs). If, for instance, an SME which 
primarily operated in Eastern and Central 
Europe brought an action against a large 
multinational corporation which it consid-
ered to be infringing its unitary patent, the 
defendant could then choose for the case to 
be heard in a UK local division, requiring the 
SME to seek legal representation in a wholly 
unfamiliar and costly location. Indeed, any 
number of scenarios could be put forward 
in which SMEs were placed at a consider-
able disadvantage in comparison to larger 
entities by forum shopping. When one of the 
purposes of the proposed patent package 
was to ease the burdens of SMEs, this fail-
ing of the Regulation can hardly be ignored.
Moreover, the problems associated with 
forum shopping are greatly exacerbated by 
the Agreement on the UPC which leaves open 
the possibility of case bifurcation. The relevant 
16.   http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/1799/179906.htm
Article of the Agreement reads as follows:
15(2) A counterclaim for revocation (Article 
15(1)(c1)) can be brought in the case of an action 
for infringement (Article 15(1)(a)). The local or 
regional division concerned shall, after having 
heard the parties, have the discretion either to:
(a) proceed with both the infringement 
action and with the counterclaim for 
revocation and request the President of 
the Court of First Instance to allocate from 
the Pool of Judges a technically qualified 
judge with qualifications and experience 
in the field of technology concerned;
(b) refer the counterclaim for decision to the 
central division and suspend or proceed 
with the infringement proceedings; or
(c) with agreement of the parties, refer the 
case for decision to the central division.
This passage essentially means that in cases 
where the defendant files a counter-claim 
to the effect that the patent which they are 
accused of infringing is not valid, the court 
can choose whether or not to divide the case 
in two, dealing infringement and validity 
separately. What is more, (b) above enables 
the court to continue with infringement pro-
ceedings while referring the question of the 
validity of the patent to the Central Division. 
The apparent reason for this option is 
an attempt to accommodate the traditional 
practices of the contracting member states in 
the field of patent lawsuits. While the current 
UK system, for instance, deals with validity 
and infringement together, it is the custom of 
German courts to deal with them separately. 
Unfortunately, while this accommodation 
may be high-minded, it has negative rami-
fications. Giving evidence before the House 
of Commons European Scrutiny Commit-
tee, Henry Carr QC explained what could 
happen if this clause is left unchanged:
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[S]ay that you are a small company; you trade 
on the internet. You can be sued anywhere and 
an injunction will apply across the whole of 
Europe. You are sued in wherever—Greece, 
an injunction is granted on the basis that 
you fall within the claims of the patent 
and three and a half years later the Central 
Division says, “Oh, by the way, that patent 
was invalid”, at which point you are out of 
business. It is a real, practical problem.17
Even in an instance in which the two 
branches of such a case were synchronised, 
the effects of this provision will still be nega-
tive. The primary reason for this is the likely 
increase in complexity and its corollary, 
cost. For small businesses either defending 
themselves against accusations of infringing 
patents or defending their patents against 
infringement, dealing with business-threat-
ening legal actions in two different countries 
at once can hardly be an appealing prospect.
It is even possible, under the structure 
proposed by the Agreement and the Regula-
tion, for a patent case to be bifurcated twice. 
In the event that Arts. 6-8 were included 
and the package was enacted, Sir Robin 
Jacob envisages the following scenario:
A case could even be broken into three parts: 
bifurcation by a regional court between [(i)] 
validity and [(ii)] infringement and further 
bifurcation of the issue of infringement between 
[(ii.a)] scope of protection and whether the 
defendant’s product or process fell within 
that scope and [(ii.b)] whether the defendant’s 
acts fell within Arts. 6 or 7 or were exempted 
under Art. 8.  [(ii.b)] could go to the CJEU 
whilst [(ii.a)] remained with the regional 
court and [(i)] went to the central division.18
17.   http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/1799/179906.htm
18.   http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/Novem-
ber/Robin%2020Jacob%2020Opinion%2020re%2020Arts.
pdf
To say that such a situation would be unde-
sirable would be to significantly understate 
the matter. Again, when the reduction of legal 
costs is one of the prime objectives of the pat-
ent package, it is disappointing to find that the 
Agreement and the Regulation tripping them-
selves up in pursuit of this worthwhile goal.
Importantly, the negative impact of the 
types of forum shopping which have been 
outlined above can, with relative ease, be 
ameliorated where it cannot be removed 
entirely. In the first instance, safeguards 
preventing spiralling costs for SMEs who are 
engaged in defending or enforcing a patent 
could be put in place. Such safeguards might 
include giving consideration to the relative 
sizes of the parties when the location of a 
case is being decided. When the defendant’s 
revenue is a large multiple of the plaintiff’s, 
or operates in every territory compared to the 
plaintiff’s limited operational scope, there is 
clearly a case for concessions to be made to the 
smaller party. Provisions for the dispensation 
of legal aid to natural persons are already out-
lined in the Agreement. In light of this, it would 
surely not be unreasonable to add the kind of 
safeguards briefly outlined above to the mon-
etary concessions which are proposed for the 
benefit of materially disadvantaged players.
With respect to the issue of bifurcation, it 
is disappointing that the drafters of the Agree-
mentdid not include the type of safeguards 
which are found in the German patent system 
which is accommodated by Art. 15(2). In the 
German system, the frequency of the prob-
lems identified by Henry Carr QC is reduced 
by analysis of the likelihood that a patent will 
be considered invalid. In first instance courts, 
if the court believes that there is an 80% or 
higher chance of a patent being found invalid, 
the infringement proceedings are stayed. In 
higher regional courts the threshold is 50%. 
It may be the case that the German Judges 
who preside over cases which are likely to be 
bifurcated decide to adhere to these standards 
regardless of their omission. Nevertheless, if 
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a high level of consistency and the elimina-
tion of regional vagaries is one of the aims 
of the patent package, making such thresh-
olds explicit would be preferable to leaving 
the question to the discretion of judges.
This is not to say that the inclusion of such 
mandates in the Agreement would negate the 
problems associated with case bifurcation. 
The popularity of the current German sys-
tem ought not be mistaken for evidence that 
bifurcating patent cases is the most prudent 
manner of dealing with patent litigation. 
This misconception has been raised explicitly 
by the IP Federation, whose spokesman, in 
response to the patent package, wrote that,
In the Federation’ view, the reason that so 
many infringement actions are brought in 
Germany is that not only is the German 
market important and the Court system there 
efficient in having cases heard promptly, 
but German infringement Courts favour 
patentees by not considering validity.19
Moreover, the Federation, which represents 
the views of UK industry in both intellectual 
property policy and practice matters within 
the EU, the UK and internationally, cites 
concerns that bifurcation may result in com-
panies relocating outside the territories of 
the contracting member states, just as some 
have left Germany for the same reason:
In the Federation’s view the answer is that 
the bifurcated system results in invalid 
monopolies being asserted successfully. 
This is self-evidently something which the 
Commission should not support. It has all 
manner of adverse consequences for European 
business. One recent example can be seen in 
the recent decision of Microsoft to relocate 
its distribution centres out of Germany and 
into the Netherlands, expressly because of 
its fears of the German Courts’ approach. 
19.   James Hayles, IP Federation policy paper 13/12, p3
If we then look forwards to a time when 
any division of the UPC may grant pan-
European injunctions without an examination 
of the defence of invalidity, we foresee a 
major distorting and deleterious effect on 
investment and growth in Europe.20
While on the subject of costs, it will be 
useful to consider the proposals for meeting 
the costs of establishing and running the new 
institutions which are created by the pat-
ent package. Both the court system and the 
patent application and registration systems 
propose to operate with balanced budgets 
and to finance themselves from the receipt 
of court fees and application and renewal 
fees respectively. This is a worthy goal: since 
the continued existence of the institutions 
necessary for the granting and protecting of 
patents is clearly in the interest of current and 
prospective patent proprietors, it is only right 
that the cost for such a system should be met 
by those who are its beneficiaries. To put it 
another way, making the system self-financing 
ought to ensure that only those who value a 
patent at or above its true cost will seek them.
Unfortunately, although the stated general 
aims of the two components of the pat-
ent package with respect to financing are 
encouraging, the specifics are less so. Article 
18(1) of the UPC, for instance, proposes 
appropriating funds from the contracting 
member states “at least in the transitional 
period as referred to in Art. 58”, and 18(2) 
lists the sources of the Courts income as 
“court fees and other revenues”. All things 
being equal, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the most expensive phase of the court’s 
existence will be this ‘transitional period’, in 
which much training and investment will be 
required. For the Court to relieve itself of the 
financial commitments entailed by its own 
establishment seems directly to contradict 
its intention of self-financing. It is true that 
20.   Ibid, p4
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some of the costs incurred in the ‘transitional 
period’ will be due to a demand shortfall 
which will end after the UPC achieves a 
monopoly position. There is perhaps a case for 
this shortfall to be met by an external fund-
ing arrangement involving the contracting 
member states and/or the European Union. 
This shortfall, however, seems in no way 
to justify demands for contracting member 
states to establish the UPC with respect to its 
facilities when the Agreement expresses its 
intention to be of “unlimited duration”.21
It may be trite to bemoan policies which 
encourage the misallocation of resources, 
but as far as patents are concerned, this is 
an especially pressing concern. If the cost 
of litigating patent is subsidised by the 
contracting member states, the only logical 
outcome can be an increase in patent litiga-
tion. This is precisely the outcome that the 
UPC is supposed to prevent. No amount of 
rhetoric about ‘fair access to justice’22 ought 
to blind us to this fact. The UPC Agreement 
contains within it a not unassailable provi-
sion for dispensing legal aid (Art. 44(1)-(3)). 
Surely the most reasonable way to deal 
with concerns about access to justice is by 
using this mechanism to dispense aid on a 
case-by-case basis: blanket subsidies funded 
by national governments are clearly inap-
propriate, yet the Agreement proposes both.
It may be objected that since the econ-
omy in general and national governments 
which derive their revenue from taxation 
benefit from the dissemination of ideas 
and improvements in technology which 
are encouraged by the patent system, it 
is only right or fair that they bare some 
of the cost. I shall therefore make a brief 
case against such a line of argument. 
It is difficult to think of any profit-making 
economic activity that does not in some way 
benefit economies in general and, by exten
21.   Art. 58c
22.   Art. 18(3)
sion, the governments which oversee them. 
Every profitable business, from shipbuild-
ing to sandwich making, generates wealth 
and increases the tax revenues of govern-
ment in the process. Many businesses require 
substantial initial capital investment. The 
precise nature of this investment varies 
from case to case: it may be the acquisi-
tion of necessary machinery or refitting a 
high-street shop. In the case of a business 
model centred on intellectual property, it 
takes the form of the fees and legal costs 
associated with a patent application. 
Though there may be more glamour in 
business which have their beginnings in a 
technological revelation, there seems to be no 
reason to set them from other entrepreneurial 
endeavours by subsidising their start-up costs 
with money taxed from other businesses who 
have not received such assistance. Low-cost 
airlines and internet retailers have augmented 
the general economy and tax receipts in the 
process, yet it would be bizarre to suggest that 
those industries receive government assist-
ance. We ought not to think of patent-driven 
businesses in a different manner altogether.
The funding regime imagined in 
the Regulation is not without its flaws, 
too. The level of fees is to be set accord-
ing to the following principles:
They shall be:
(a) progressive throughout the term of 
the unitary patent protection, and 
(b) sufficient not only to cover all costs 
associated with the grant of the European 
patent and the administration of the 
unitary patent protection but also, 
(c) sufficient together with the fees to be paid 
to the European Patent Organisation during 
the pre-grant stage, to ensure a balanced 
10	 Policy	Paper
budget of the European Patent Organisation.23
Again, the overall aim is admirable, but 
the specifics seem misguided. The thinking 
behind (a) is quite clear: the drafters of the 
Regulation would like to discourage patent 
holders from renewing their patents and, in 
so doing, preventing a new generation of 
entrepreneurs and inventors from advanc-
ing technology and benefiting the economy. 
The logic, however, is hardly impeccable: 
if a patent is not worth renewing, then it is 
hardly likely to be doing much to prevent 
progress. Increasing the renewal fee by a 
given increment, furthermore, seems unlikely 
to move a significant number of patents out 
of the ‘worth renewing’ bracket. Indeed, 
the Impact Assessment which accompanies 
the Regulation produces an figure for the 
initial validation and translation of a Euro-
pean patent with unitary effect which is so 
low (EUR 680)24 that significant discour-
agement of patent renewal could only be 
achieved by geometrical increases in fees.
This low level of initial cost in applying 
for a patent is one of the chief benefits of 
the proposed system. On 29 June 2012 Com-
missioner Barnier hinted in a press-release 
that one of the motivating factors behind 
the patent package was fear that “Europe is 
falling behind the US and China in number 
of patents granted”.25 If the cost of necessary 
translation and validation does in fact work 
out at less than EUR 700 for the entire terri-
tory of the contracting member states, then it 
seems likely that there will be more patents 
issued both to domestic European players 
and those coming from abroad. No doubt 
23.   Art. 15
24.   Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assess-
ment: Accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection, p32
25.   http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/12/509
Commissioner Barnier hopes that promoting 
patent proliferation will result in a stronger 
science and technology driven economy, but 
it is surely implicit in his remarks that more 
good patents, rather than just more patents, 
are desired. With this in mind, it is worth con-
sidering whether it is appropriate to back-load 
the fee structure of the European patent with 
unitary effect. That is, to identify the likely 
outcome of having a ‘progressive’ fee system. 
Given that the most costly and most impor-
tant phase, both for the applicant and for the 
patent office, of a patent’s existence is the first, 
it seems counter-productive to set fees at a 
higher level for renewals than for applications. 
The least desirable outcome of a patent system 
would be one in which frivolous applications 
are made affordable, substantially delaying 
the approval of other applications by the 
increase in volume and potentially reducing 
the quality of the patent office’s work in the 
process. But by making the initial fee lower 
than subsequent fees, the Regulation almost 
seems to encourage half-hearted applications 
for patents by subsidising the initial price with 
funds levied by higher renewal fees. A flat or 
inflation-linked fee structure seems preferable.
Finally, it is worth pointing out the slightly 
paradoxical criteria for locating the individual 
courts of the UPC. That is, while the Court is 
designed as an international forum in which 
inherently international cases will be tried, 
the Agreement provides for the creation of 
courts on a nation-by-nation basis. These 
local divisions are then to be supplemented 
by regional division which are to be formed 
by two or more contracting member states. 
The reasoning behind the creation of parallel 
but distinct branches of the UPC system is, 
to say the least, murky. I would argue that it 
would be far more coherent for courts of first 
instance to be created on a purely regional 
basis, either using the Agreement’s procedure 
for contracting member states to come to 
agreements independently or by dividing 
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according to geography. The latter could be 
designed in a similar way to the US courts of 
appeals, in which the fifty states are divided 
in to eleven circuits such that no circuit con-
tains only one state.26 Either reform would 
result in a simpler and perhaps cheaper court 
systemand minimise the impact of procedural 
differences between historic jurisdictions.
Thus far, this report’s analysis of the pat-
ent package has been wholly negative. It 
would neither be truthful to claim that the 
above constitutes a full enumeration of the 
problems legal and practical in the package, 
nor that it has no redeeming virtues. In fact, 
its virtues are multiple. Chiefly, the package 
will evidently reduce the costs associated with 
applying for and defending a patent across 
the territories of the contracting member 
states. The current validation and transla-
tion costs, not to mention the complexity of 
individual renewal payments across jurisdic-
tions is enormous. The Impact Assessment 
cited above puts the figure at upwards of 
EUR 32,000, excluding legal fees, for patent 
protection throughout the 27 member states of 
the Union. This cost may well be the primary 
reason for the infrequency of applications for 
patent protection in all 27 states: only 2% of 
the 50,000 patents validated each year cover 
the entire EU. Such a low figure shows not 
only that domestic patent proprietors balk 
at the price of protection but that potential 
foreign applicants react in the same manner. 
A precipitous reduction in the cost of pat-
ent validation such as that brought about 
by the patent package under consideration 
will surely result in a far greater number of 
(almost) pan-European patents being issued, 
which, in turn, should result in greater 
harmonisation across the single market.
By means of the unitary nature of the 
patents which are to be issued under the 
26.   The 12th Circuit, which covers the District of Co-
lumbia does not, for obvious reasons, conform to this 
pattern.
Regulation, the package also ensures that legal 
costs will be substantially reduced. The reduc-
tion of such costs is of crucial importance to 
the sustainability of the European patent sys-
tem. While validation costs imposed on patent 
applicants are useful to the extent that they 
are used to perpetuate the system of patent 
protection, legal costs are a loss to society. This 
is because they represent a substantial transfer 
of wealth away from developers, produc-
ers and licensers which leads to consumers 
bearing the cost, either through reductions 
in research and development spending or 
increased prices. It is therefore imperative 
both for consumer protection and the propa-
gation of a ‘knowledge-based economy’ that 
such transaction costs are kept to a minimum.
This report has so far criticised the pack-
age on the grounds that it fails to take every 
opportunity to reduce legal costs for pat-
ent proprietors and other players. Such 
criticism is by no means intended to imply 
that implementation of the package, even 
including Arts. 6-8 of the Regulation, would 
not in all likelihood reduce legal costs. It is 
true that unitary effect is a double-edged 
sword insofar as it reduces legal costs by 
making the outcome of one case apply for 
the whole of the territory of the contracting 
member states, but at the same time raises 
the stakes of each legal action for the same 
reason. Nevertheless, the steps the package 
takes to the end of reducing legal costs are 
laudable; it is simply disappointing that its 
drafters failed to take advantage of every 
opportunity for maximising such reductions.
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Conclusion
I therefore conclude the following: the 
patent package has many failings and over-
sights, but despite these it still constitutes an 
advance towards a coherent European patent 
system which is compatible with the single 
market. As I have tried to demonstrate, the 
negative aspects of the package are largely 
soluble, but whether there exists the necessary 
political will to, for instance, insist that Ger-
man local divisions refrain from bifurcating 
patent disputes is questionable. Moreover, just 
as the location of the Central Division of the 
Court of First Instance created an impasse for 
several months, argument and compromise 
look set to dog the progress of the patent 
package. It could well be the case that these 
negotiations either cause further damage to 
the package or, worse, derail the entire project 
like those of 1975, 1989 and 2000. Seemingly 
at every turn, deficits of political will obstruct 
and obfuscate what is fundamentally a step 
in the right direction: thirty-fold reductions 
in validation costs and massive reductions 
in legal costs are not to be sniffed at.
The Future of the Patent Package 
and Patent Law Reform
It is my belief, as I outlined above, that the 
implementation of the patent package would 
bring about significant benefits. It is true that 
UPC, insofar as it will exist in conjunction 
with national patent courts, will be costly. This 
fact, however, ought to be mitigated by the 
derivation of the court’s funding from fees 
paid by litigants. More importantly, it seems 
clear to me that it will provide a service which 
cannot be provided by national courts, and 
that in doing so will substantially benefit cur-
rent and prospective patent holders. Even if 
the eventual application and translation costs 
associated with a European patent with uni-
tary effect are a small multiple of the Impact 
Assessment’s estimated figure, huge savings 
will still be made with respect to securing 
patent protection across the Union. Moreo-
ver, the Uniform Court and unitary effect of 
patents will substantially reduce legal costs 
incurred in defending or enforcing patents. 
Both of these effects of the patent package will 
reduce barriers to entry for small and medium 
sized businesses and reduce the ability of 
established players to obstruct new entrants 
by means of expensivelitigation. In their turn, 
larger European corporations ought to benefit 
to the extent that reductions in costs will make 
possible greater research and development or 
other productive spending. Moreover, inter-
national corporations which had previously 
been discouraged from the European market 
by the fragmented and costly nature of the 
patent protection system will find it easier 
to enter the market thanks to the sweeping 
simplifications enacted by the patent package. 
Even a cursory examination of the data 
presented by the Impact Assessment dem-
onstrates that Europe is put at a significant 
disadvantage by the fragmentary nature of the 
current system. The total number of patents 
filed at the EPO in 2009 (134,542) was just 40 
per cent of the number filed at the JPO and 
less than 30 per cent of the number filed at the 
USPTO. Given that the size of the economy 
and population served by the EPO is greater 
than both Japan and the US, at least some of 
this shortfall is attributable to the expense and 
complexity generated by the current system. 
If the data are broken down into foreign and 
domestic filings, it becomes apparent that 
reform is needed if companies from the rest 
of the world are to be induced to share their 
knowledge and engage in business in Europe: 
while the USPTO received 236,315 foreign 
applications, the EPO received just 65,945. The 
fact that a US is six times cheaper than com-
plete protection in Europe cannot be ignored.
These benefits will take effect to a greater 
or lesser degree, I would submit, according to 
the extent to which the flaws I have outlined 
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above are eliminated or mitigated. For the 
avoidance of doubt, it is my position that the 
patent package would be greatly beneficial to 
the European economy in general and intel-
lectual property-driven sectors in particular 
even if it were implemented as it was initially 
proposed. If, in the course of the negotia-
tions which are set to take place in September 
2012, Articles 6-8 of the Regulation are rein-
serted, this would not change my opinion. 
Their inclusion should be tolerated if it is 
the price for the enactment of the package.
Additionally, it may well be the case that 
the reports on the European patent with uni-
tary effect and the UPC, which are scheduled 
to take place within six years of their introduc-
tion, identify many of the deficiencies of the 
package which current critics have. Rectifying 
such flaws may then prove more politically 
feasible since negotiations will not jeopardise 
the entire programme. This is yet another rea-
son why the problems in the package should 
be overlooked in the interest of its more rapid 
deployment. If the Advisory Committee of the 
UPC could be given discretionary powers to 
enact smaller changes as the Court encoun-
ters new problems, this would be argument 
would, I believe, be even more compelling.
In the short term, then, I would advocate 
the implementation of the patent package 
in the best state to which it can feasibly be 
brought. In the medium term, as I have said, 
improvements could be made on the basis 
of reports on the operations of the Court. In 
the long term, however, I would argue that 
further simplification is highly desirable.
The structure of the patent package and 
its machinery which has been assessed above 
is designed to exist above and separate 
from current national patent regimes. In my 
view, this would be a mistaken long-term 
approach. While this patent package is com-
mendable to the extent that it reduces some 
of the friction inherent in the EPC system, 
it should not be considered the last word 
in patent reform. When it comes to intan-
gible assets, either there is a single market 
or there is not. Ideas travel exceptionally 
fast, and the fruit of others’ endeavours, 
particularly in the field of software patents, 
can be expropriated at equal velocity. 
In light of this, the most logical European 
patent system would be one of full integra-
tion. That is, contracting member states ought 
collectively to address the issues associated 
with substantive patent law and produce 
a single set of rules in place of historical 
national patent laws. A corollary of such a 
system would be the assimilation of national 
patent courts into the UPC framework, 
equalising costs and enhancing consistency. 
Ultimately, it is counterproductive for 
the lawmakers of the EU to point to the 
virtues of the single market while refusing 
to acknowledge the importance of a single 
legal framework in which such a market 
might be able to operate. Nowhere is this 
oversight more confounding than in the 
approach taken towards patent law. If the 
European patent system were to function like 
a national patent system writ large, it would 
surely be cheaper, simpler and more condu-
cive to technological advancement. Such a 
system would be preferable to the chimera 
– part national, part international and part 
EU – which will exist upon the implementa-
tion of the patent package. It is thoroughly 
understandable that a simplified system along 
these lines was not proposed in this pack-
age: the leap would, perhaps, have been too 
great to be conscionable. But the important 
reforms proposed by the package and the 
institutions which it creates should be used 
as a foundation for further reform. If there is 
to be an enduring European patent system, 
unless and until such sweeping reforms are 
enacted there is more work to be done.
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